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ARRANGEMENTS AND EDITIONS OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN MUSIC: ORIGINALITY IN A FINITE
SYSTEM*
Copyright law seeks toprotect originality, in the context of derivative music, how-
ever, courts have struggled to dfne originality. Hampered by unfamiliarity with
musical terminology and basic compositional techniques, courts have gropedfor
standards of easy application. But originality is not amenable to bright line stan-
dards. Indeed, stark distinctions between originality and nonoriginality are neither
feasible nor responsible. This Note critiques existing judicial standardsfor assessing
the originality of derivative works and offers suggestionsfor a moreflexible alloca-
tion of copyright protection. It identoes the conflicting goals of copyright
law-protecting a composer's originality while preserving the availability ofpublic
domain music andideas--anddemonstrates how those goals may be reconciled Fi-
nally, the Note explores the benefts and limitations of expert testimony in musical
copyright litigation, and shows how experts, without usurping the judicial function,
can assist courts in reaching more sophisticated decisions.
INTRODUCTION
MUSIC IS A FINITE SYSTEM, capable of infinite permuta-
tions. Its twelve tones' are juxtaposed and placed in succes-
sion by the composer to convey an emotional and artistic intent.
Copyright law seeks to determine whether a certain combination
of tones is "original" within this finite system. Derivative works
involve a more difficult question: To what extent is the derivation
original?
The problem in discussing musical copyright is that music is
sound, which cannot be verbally broken down and described.2
The words developed in musical analysis are merely attempts to
describe why a piece might work, and what some trained ears
* First prize, Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP)).
1. Traditional western music consists of twelve chromatic tones: c, c0, d, d&, e, f, f-,
g, g#, a, a#, and b. Since a piece may go on for an indefinite period of time, there are an
infinite number of arrangements of these tones.
2. Although initially I was uncertain whether to include musical excerpts in foot-
notes, I came to realize that by neglecting to do so I would be as remiss as the courts I
criticize for failing to present the musical material at issue. To those who do not read
music, I extend sincere apologies for any difficulties encountered with the excerpts. Most
of the pieces cited are readily accessible in a record library.
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might hear when they listen to a piece.3 Thus, the gray area be-
tween language and musical sound is both the context and the
cause of the problems discussed herein.4
This Note addresses the failure of courts to provide a logical
relationship between musical analysis and legal analysis regarding
the originality of derivative works in the public domain. The
Note first examines the evolution of statutory5 and judicial6 meth-
ods of assessing originality, and discusses their virtues and inade-
quacies. It then critiques the standards courts have used for
extending copyright protection to works in the public domain.7
Finally, the Note explores the benefits and limitations of expert
testimony in musical copyright litigation,8 and offers suggestions
for reconciling legal and musical analysis of originality.9
I. STATUTORY APPROACHES TO COPYRIGHTABILITY OF
DERIVATIVE WORKS
A. Early English Statutes
The earliest copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,10 was
passed in 1710. It totally neglected the subject of music,11 leaving
3. When, after that first evening at the Verdurins', he had had the little phrase
played over to him again, and had sought to disentangle from his confused im-
pressions how it was that, like a perfume or a caress, it swept over and enveloped
him, he had observed that it was to the closeness of the intervals between the five
notes which composed it and to the constant repetition of two of them that was
due that impression of a frigid and withdrawn sweetness; but in reality he knew
that he was basing this conclusion not upon the phrase itself, but merely upon
certain equivalents, substituted (for his mind's convenience) for the mysterious
entity of which he had become aware ....
I M. PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST 380 (C.K.S. Moncrieff & T. Kilmartin
trans. 1981).
4. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), Justice
Story offered an insight into the judiciary's discomfort with the subtle distinctions of copy-
right law. In copyright, he said, a judge is faced with
one of those intricate and embarrassing questions, arising in the administration of
civil justice, in which it is not, from the peculiar nature and character of the con-
troversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general
principles applicable to all cases. Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than
any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called
the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very
subtle and refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent.
5. See infra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 27-122 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 123-74 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 175-99 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 200-28 and accompanying text.
10. 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19.
11. This statute was described as one "of the most laboriously considered acts that
ever passed the legislature" of England. D'Almaine v. Boosey, 160 Eng. Rep. 117, 122 (Ex.
1983]
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a void that was not to be filled until the Victoria Statutes in
1842.12 While the Victoria Statutes did protect original composi-
tions, courts were unwilling to extend such protection to deriva-
tive works of public domain music. They reasoned that while
an original work requires "genius for its construction,. . . a mere
mechanic in music can make the adaptation or accom-
paniment."'13
A rigid distinction between original and derivative works per-
sisted throughout the nineteenth century. Its harshness is exem-
plified by Carte v. Duff,14 in which Gilbert and Sullivan's
"Mikado" was lost to the public domain in the United States. The
British authors, seeking copyright protection in America, engaged
an American musician to come to London and prepare a piano
arrangement from the original score. 5 The musician, George
Tracey, returned to the United States and copyrighted the ar-
rangement as his own original work. 6 An impresario pirated
Tracey's arrangement and attempted to stage the opera in New
York City.' 7 When Tracey sought to enforce his copyright, the
court denied him protection. It asserted that an arrangement can-
not be an original work; that an arranger "originates nothing,
composes no new notes or melodies, and simply culls the notes
representing the melodies and their accompaniments .... "Is
Thus, Tracey's arrangement was an uncopyrightable derivative
work, and the impresario was free to use it.19
B. 1909 Copyright Act
Copyright protection in the United States was finally extended
to derivative works by the Copyright Act of 1909.20 The new stat-
1835). For the court to praise such a statute as well thought out may indicate an instinctive
reluctance to give music, let alone derivative music, much protecti6n.
12. 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 45, § 2. Case law had determined much earlier, however,
that the statute was applicable to music. The case that declared this right to copyright was
brought by Johann Christian Bach (son of Johann Sebastian Bach). See Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B. 1777).
13. D'Almaine v. Boosey, 160 Eng. Rep. at 123.
14. 25 F. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
15. Id. at 183.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 184.
18. Id. at 185.
19. Id. at 187.
20. Ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)):
That compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations,
translations, or other versions of works in the public domain, or of copyrighted
[Vol. 34:104
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ute was silent, however, regarding the extent of this protection.
Copyright could be obtained for derivations of public domain ma-
terial or, with the author's permission, of copyrighted mate-
rial-and such derivations would be deemed new works under the
statute.21 It remained unclear, however, whether these "new
works" were copyrightable in their entirety or only to the extent
that they modified the borrowed material.22
C. 1976 Copyright Act
After decades of judicial uncertainty,23 the Copyright Act of
197624 made clear that derivative works are copyrightable only to
the extent that they modify the preexisting material.2 5 Copyright
protection extends only to "the material added by the later author,
and has no effect. . . on the copyright or public domain status of
the preexisting material."26
While the 1976 Act protects any original contribution that an
arranger brings to an existing piece, the statute fails to specify
minimum standards for gauging the originality of that contribu-
tion. It was left to the courts to formulate guidelines for the requi-
site degree of originality a derivative work must possess to
warrant copyright protection. In both the formulation and appli-
works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such
works, or works republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new works
subject to copyright under the provisions of this Act; but the publication of any
such new works shall not affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright
upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclu-
sive right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in
such original works.
Id., ch. 320, § 6, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077.
21. Id
22. By referring to derivative works as "new works," the statute created the impres-
sion that derivations were copyrightable in their entirety. The drafters meant to say that a
derivative work is copyrightable only to the extent that it modifies the original work. But
they expressed this idea negatively, stating that the copyright or public domain status of an
original work would not be affected by the protection afforded derivative works. See supra
note 20. By failing to express in specific, affirmative terms the degree of copyright protec-
tion to be afforded derivative works, the drafters created needless and lasting confusion.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 5659, 5670 (acknowledging the lingering confusion caused by the 1909
Act).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1976).
26. H.R. Ran. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5670. Nevertheless, courts continue to blur this distinction. See, e.g.,
Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds, 720 F.2d 733, 739 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom Mills
Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 52 U.S.L.W. 3701 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1984) (No. 83-1153).
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cation of these guidelines, courts have been hampered by an igno-
rance of basic musical terms and an unfamiliarity with the music
industry.
II. JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR ORIGINALITY
A. The Mere Mechanic Test
American courts initially took a dim view of arrangements of
public domain music. In the seminal case of Jollie v. Jacques,27
two different arrangements of a folksong were deemed un-
copyrightable because both were derived from a public domain
melody. Employing the English rule governing the adaptation of
airs, the court decided that since a "mere mechanic" could per-
form these arrangements,28 they exhibited insufficient originality
to warrant copyright protection.29 While the mere mechanic stan-
dard persisted in the United States, it was specifically rejected in
England thirteen years after Jo/lie. In Wood v. Boosey,3° the court
held that a piano arrangement of an opera was an independent
musical composition worthy of copyright protection.31 It declared
that, in adapting a work to a particular instrument, arrangements
27. 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
28. Id at 913. The "mere mechanic" language is from D'Almaine v. Boosey, 160 Eng.
Rep. at 123.
29. Id. On the quantum of artistry needed to compose a variation on public domain
folk melodies, the following observations have been offered:
Many people think it a comparatively easy task to write a composition round
folk-tunes. A lesser achievement at least than a composition on "original"
themes. Because, they think, the composer has dispensed with part of the work:
the invention of themes.
This way of thought is completely erroneous. To handle folk-tunes is one of
the most difficult tasks; equally difficult if not more so than to write a major origi-
nal composition. If we keep in mind that borrowing a tune means being bound
by its individual peculiarity we shall understand one part of the difficulty. An-
other is created by the special character of a folk-tune. We must penetrate into it,
feel it, and bring it out in sharp contours by the appropriate setting. The compo-
sition round a folk-tune must be done in a "propitious hour" or-as is generally
said-it must be a work of inspiration just as much as any other compostion.
Bart6k, The Influence of Peasant Music on Modern Music, TEMPO, Winter 1949-50, at 19,
22.
The master who has the skill to develop a great musical work certainly possesses
the ability to evolve melodies. When he takes a folk-theme as the subject of one
of his master works, it is for the purpose of elaborating and beautifying it as a
lapidary might take an unpolished diamond, and by his skill bring out the scintil-
lating and kaleidoscopic beauties of the stone. After all, the handling of the
theme is even more significant than the evolution of the theme.
J. CooKE, GREAT MEN AND FAMous MUSICIANS ON THE ART OF Music 433 (1925) (inter-
view with Gustav Mahler).
30. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 223 (1868).
31. Id. at 230.
[Vol. 34:104
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entail "invention" amounting to "composition."32
Nevertheless, American courts continued to apply the stan-
dard. Harmonization of preexisting works was considered a
purely mechanical skill, unworthy of copyright protection.33
Likewise, an arrangement using a simple "staccato beat" to har-
monize a preexisting melody was deemed to require only mechan-
ical skill, and hence was denied protection.34 Even literary
endeavors were affected by the mere mechanic test. In Grove
32. Id. at 232-33. After rejecting the mere mechanic standard, id. at 229-30, the court
emphasized the skill and judgment required in arranging. Id. at 231-32. Ironically, the
court refused to enforce the copyright because the composer of the original opera-not the
arranger himself-had been registered as the author of the arrangement. Id. at 230-31.
33. Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 872-73 (N.D. Ga. 1914). In Cooper, an alto line was
added to the public domain works "Nearer My God to Thee," "The Promised Land," and
"Coronation." The court described these alto lines as "mere improvements." Id. at 873.
Could it not have granted protection to the extent of these improvements? Many chorales
are based on plainsong or folktunes. Through the originality of many gifted composers,
the individuality of these arrangements gave rise to the different church liturgies. See 4
NEW GROvE DIcTIoNARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 314 (S. Sadie 5th ed. 1980). As for
the proposition that harmonizations are "mere improvements," see the following two ex-
amples with a change in the alto line. In the first example (by J.S. Bach) the alto line is
fluid and completes the harmonies. The alto line in the second example (by Ronald P.
Smith) is awkward and fails to fill in the center.
I P F" I I I [ ! I J J i I !
I low I
T r
, A i I i , ! J l J _,. .
J.S. Bach, Chorale, "0 Haupt voll Blut und Wunden," from St. Matthew Passion, Part II,
BWV 244 (c. 1727).
34. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473, 474 (N.D. Ill.
1950). The term "staccato beat" was used incorrectly by the Shapiro court. Staccato is an
articulation--the length and accent of the note-whereas beat is the regular procession of
the pulse of a piece. If the court meant a staccato rhythm, it could have meant either
(a): .J I J
or
(b): in J iJL
The court was probably referring to a simple staccato rhythm, as exemplified by (b). Its
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Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publishers, Inc. ,3 an editor made 40,000
changes in grammar, syntax, and word choice in a public domain
biography. When another publisher photocopied this work for
publication of his own edition, the editor brought suit to enjoin
publication. Describing the editorial changes as work that any
"high school English student" could do, 36 the court denied the
injunction.
The inadequacy of the mere mechanic test stems partly from
its preoccupation with the individual elements of a piece-its fail-
ure to examine the musical work as a whole. In Smith v. George E.
Muehlebach Brewing Co. , the words "Tic Toc, Tic Toc, Time for
Muehlebach" were set to the rhythm of a ticking clock in a simple
two-note, c-g pattern. 8 The court found that the individual ele-
ments of the piece were too "common" to warrant protection, and
therefore denied copyright to the composition as a whole.39 Al-
though this jingle is admittedly not an inspiring work of art, the
court could have granted copyright to the specific expression cre-
ated by the combination of these elements. Focusing on the work
as a whole, the court could have extended limited protection to the
"song" itself, proscribing only a direct copy. Instead, the court ap-
plied a standard "mechanical" test4" to a system it clearly did not
reference to "staccato" was irrelevant, since articulation has no impact on harmony. Thus,
even the most basic "mechanical" terms were misunderstood by this court.
An opposite result was reached in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y.
1924). There, staccato and legato versions of an ostinato (an ostinato is a repeating line,
usually present in the bass, 14 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 11 (S.
Sadie 5th ed. 1980)) were held to be similar. The court therefore found an infringement
even though both ostinatos consisted of little more than do-re-mi:
'I!l I I[i . I!l
0-~ MEk ,,w==o
(The top line is defendant's ostinato; the bottom line is plaintiff's.) Since do-re-mi are the
first three notes of any major scale, the Fred Fisher court effectively granted copyright
protection to a basic building block of western music. One wonders whether this court
truly understood what was before it. Music from Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement:
The Requirement of Substantiality, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 84, 107 (1977).
35. 264 F. Supp. 603, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
36. Id at 605.
37. 140 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
38. Id at 730.
39. Id at 730-32.
40. Id. at 731.
Vol. 34:104
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understand.41
Courts utilizing the mere mechanic standard determine
copyrightability not by looking at the originality of an expression,
but at the level of musicianship required to communicate it. In
McInYre v. Double-A-Music Corp. ,42 the court denied copyright
protection to an arrangement of a Bing Crosby song because it
viewed the arrangement as "melodic and harmonic embellish-
ments" that "are frequently improvised by any competent musi-
cian."43 But, are embellishments frequently improvised by all
competent musicians? Would not a competent classical pianist be
less capable of improvising these embellishments than a jazz pian-
ist? Would a competent pianist have the same capacity to fill in a
41. The court evinced its lack of understanding by misusing musical terminology.
This is not to imply that the court reached an untenable result in finding the two-note
pattern uncopyrightable. It does demonstrate, however, that the court was not sufficiently
familiar with music to administer a "mechanical skills" test with consistency or discrimina-
tion.
In laying out the facts, the court first stated that the lyrics were set to "' and 'g' in the
musical key of 'C."' Id. at 730. Subsequently, however, the court spoke of "two notes in a
common musical scale," id., and "two notes in the commonest scale of music," id. at 731.
Thus, the court used "scale" and "key" interchangeably. This is incorrect. A scale is a set
pattern of notes; a key is a general feeling of focus in reference to internal musical relation-
ships. A key may be defined while omitting notes from its complementary scale or by
reference to notes outside its scale. It consists of two elements: tonal center (the reference
point to which tensions in the key resolve), and mode (e.g., major, minor, blues, phrygian).
A scale, on the other hand, is a progression of wholesteps and halfsteps beginning on a note
and ending an octave (eight notes) higher. A C major scale, for example, is: c-d-e-f-g-a-b-
c.
Had the court enjoyed a familiarity with music, it would have recognized the inaccu-
racy of using these terms interchangeably. Moreover, its use of the word "common"-
whether meant to describe key or scale-makes little sense musically. With only two notes
as a reference point, it is impossible to discern which key the work at issue was in. It might
be a "common" major or minor key, or a more unusual mode: harmonic minor, phrygian,
even a pentatonic system.
Ultimately, though, the Muehlebach court's emphasis on scale or key was irrelevant,
since originality-the sole concern of copyright-does not depend on the scale or key of a
work. What was "common" about the work before the court was not its scale or key, but
the relationship between the two notes. The c-g relationship is termed a fifth (because
there is a five-note interval from c to g: c-d-e-f-g). This interval is the second most natural
relationship in music (after c-c), and occurs in almost all traditional western and eastern
scales. C. ROSEN, THE CLAssICAL STYLE 23 (1973). The tonic-dominant relationship of c-
g is the basic tension-resolution relationship in music. Thus, the Muehlebach court reached
the correct result for the wrong reason. It should have denied copyright not because plain-
tiff sought protection for two notes of a "common" scale, but because the plaintiff sought
protection for a basic building block of the musical language.
42. 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
43. Id at 683.
1983]
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figured bass as a competent harpsichordist? '
These are questions which must be addressed by a test that
focuses more on competence than originality. Yet it is originality,
not competence, that copyright law seeks to protect. a5 Moreover,
it is questionable whether courts are competent to administer a
musical competence test.4
Another problem with the mere mechanic test is that it inher-
ently favors the ornate over the simple-a problem common to
much of copyright. When a simple harmonic chord was utilized
in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co. , the court
deemed it a "mechanical application" insufficiently complex to
warrant protection.48 Would the application of Wagnerian chro-
matic harmonies to a Mozart song be less mechanical and there-
fore more worthy of copyright than a simple stylistic chord
progression?49 With derivative works, the issue is not only one of
44. Example (a) is the original figured bass by J.S. Bach. Example (b) is a realization
of the figured bass by Lawrence Hampton:
(a): 6 6 6 71' 5 6
4 4 5,
31 2
(b):
6 6 6 7 1'
4 4
30 2
5 6
J.S. Bach, Cantata, "Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme," BWV 140, Choral Fantasia, meas.
103-07 (1731). The original would merely have included a simple bass line with numbers.
The other notes would then be filled in by the performer. While accomplished pianists
often purchase a realization, many harpsichordists fill in the bass while sightreading the
work.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) ("Copyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship") (emphasis added).
46. A lack of competence may be inferred from the courts' misuse of musical termi-
nology. See supra notes 34 & 41.
47. 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. I1M. 1950).
48. Id. at 474-75.
49. What follows is the application of a more complex harmony by Ronald P. Smith
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taste-society has an interest in preserving a composer's style and
intent.5 0
Ultimately, the mere mechanic test is almost impossible to ap-
ply because music by its very nature employs a great deal of
mechanics in giving voice to the imagination. This is especially
true in the area of form. Sonata-allegro,51 rondo,52 and scherzo 3
forms lay broad mechanical outlines of large sections of music. A
step-wise progression of rules governs the composition of inven-
tions in the style of J.S. Bach. 4 Species counterpoint is a set of
rules governing the compositional style of the Renaissance.55 Seri-
alism56 is a compositional method in which a fixed series of tones
governs the placement of the notes. These systems set up mechan-
ical rules for expanding smaller fragments of music into larger
pieces. While the first two systems can be distinguished as "only"
to a melody by Mozart. Is the result more deserving of protection than the original? The
dissonance and chromaticism of the harmony are very much out of place compared to the
simple, elegant melody:
Top line from W.A. Mozart, Sonata in C Major, K. 545, Mvt. I, meas. 1-4 (1788).
50. See Coon, Some Problems with Musical Public Domain Material Under United
States Copyright Law as Illustrated Mainly by the Recent Folk Song Revival, 19 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 189, 202 (1971).
51. Sonata-allegro in its simplest form consists of the exposition in the tonic, develop-
ment in the dominant, with recapitulation of the original material in the tonic. The tonic is
the tonal center of a key. For instance, in the key of C Major, c is the tonic and g is the
dominant. C. RosEN, supra note 41, at 30.
52. Rondo form consists of a main theme which recurs between subsidiary sections
and returns to conclude the composition (ABAC... A) (letters represent thematic mate-
rial). 16 NEw GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 172 (S. Sadie 5th ed. 1980).
53. Scherzo form is generally A, A, BA, BA, C, C, DC, DC, A, BA. It usually occurs
in 3/4 time. Id. at 634.
54. An invention in the style of J.S. Bach can be written as follows: Take a melody,
repeat it an octave lower in a second voice, introduce it again in an upper voice, sequence
(i.e., repeat the same melodic fragment but up or down a set interval), then invert the
melody, sequence in the other voice, and cadence. Then, use the theme and inversion in
sequence and stretto. Finish by recapitulating the original material and cadence to the
tonic.
55. Species counterpoint is a step-wise progression of rules for learning the composi-
tional style of the High Renaissance.
56. Serialism is a method of composition in which a fixed permutation, or series, of
elements is referential; i.e., the handling of those elements in the composition is governed,
to some extent and in some manner, by the series. A twelve-tone series is most commonly
used. This technique was developed by Arnold Schoenberg in the 1920's. 17 NEw GROVE
DICTIONARY OF MUsic AND MUSICIANS 162 (S. Sadie 5th ed. 1980).
19831
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educational techniques for learning compositional styles, serialism
and computer music raise doubts about the viability of the mere
mechanic standard. Would application of the mechanical rules of
serialism preclude copyright? Is the musician-turned-computer
programmer capable of composing nonmechanical music? 57 The
mere mechanic test is unsuitable for older forms of music and is
obsolete with regard to more modern, mathematical forms.
57. What follows is a composition by Michael Praetorius programmed for a computer
performance by Isadore Schoen:
11 -, / ," r L
M. Praetorius, "Vater Unser," Bicinium (excerpt from D. GROUT, A HISTORY OF WEST-
ERN Music 257 (rev. ed. 1973)).
10 Rem Music Program
20 Open #1, 0, 1 "Vater"
30 Poke 36878, 15 Rem set volume of note
40 Input #1, note, delay
50 Poke 36874, note
60 For I = I to (delay * 1000): Next I Rem delay
70 Poke 36878, 0 Rem turn note off
80 If not EOF go to 30
90 Close #1: End
215 1
223 1 209 1 207 1
225 1.50 207 1 195 2
228 1 201 2 191 2
223 1 201 1 183 2
225 1 207 1
217 .5 201 1
225 .5 201 .5
215 .5 207 .25
215 .5 209 .25
207 .5 207 .5
209 1 219 2
215 1 209 1
215 2 225 1
215 1 215 1
207 1 201 1
209 1 195 1
215 1 201 1
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B. Substantiality Test
1. Seminal Efforts
A more positive approach to musical derivative works was
eventually adopted by various courts. This approach examined
the differences between original and derivative works. Where the
differences proved sufficiently substantial, the derivative work was
deemed copyrightable as an independent composition. This sub-
stantiality test was first applied in Wood v. Boosey.58 The Wood
court examined a piano arrangement of an opera. It found that
the arrangement, while necessarily resembling the opera in many
respects, contained substantial differences as well.5 9 By translat-
ing a score for many instruments into a piece for only the piano,
60
the arrangement constituted a significant departure from the origi-
nal, and was therefore worthy of protection as "a new and sepa-
rate work." 6
1
American courts adopted the substantiality test as a most strin-
gent standard. InHein v. Harris,62 the court applied the substanti-
ality test by means of a quantitative analysis to determine whether
one song infringed the copyright of another. Finding that thirteen
out of seventeen measures were "substantially the same in each
song," 63 the court deemed the defendant's song an infringement.
Yet the court's finding of substantial similarity was based not on a
detailed comparison of notes, but by listening to corresponding
measures played in succession.64 Moreover, the court was predis-
posed to find such similarity: it described the popular style in
question as having produced "numberless songs" of "a monoto-
nous similarity," each bearing a "strong resemblance" to one an-
other.65 While the court paid lip service to the notion that the
musical merit of a work has no bearing on its copyrightability, 66
58. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 223,229-30 (1868). Although first applied in Wood, the substantiality
test was first articulated in dicta in D'Almaine v. Boosey, 160 Eng. Rep. 117, 123 (K.B.
1835) ("It must depend on whether the air taken is substantially the same with the origi-
nal.'). The D'Almaine court based its decision more on the mere mechanic test, id.; it
neither developed nor applied the substantiality test.
59. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 229.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 230.
62. 175 F. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
63. Id. at 876.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 877.
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its distaste for the style in question67 may have impaired its capac-
ity to identify originality in the defendant's song. The style was
the infamous ragtime. 8
2. Further Refinement: The "Distinctive Characteristic" Test
In refining the definition of substantiality, courts developed
distinctions between "colorable attempts" 69 at copying and "dis-
tinctive characteristic[s]" 7 ° of originality. In Supreme Records, Inc.
v. Decca Records, Inc. ," the plaintiff recorded an arrangement of
a popular song. This arrangement added an introduction, hand-
clapping, choral responses, and further instrumentation to the
original work.72 Using the plaintiff's ideas, the defendant created
its own arrangement of the song, adding a more complex orches-
tration, fuller harmonization, a different ending, and other ideas.73
The plaintiff sued the defendant for appropriating its arrange-
ment.74 The court stated that a musical arrangement is unworthy
of copyright protection unless it has "a distinctive characteristic
...of such character that any person hearing it played would
become aware of the distinctiveness of the arrangement."75 The
court asserted that the techniques employed in the plaintiffs ar-
rangement were commonly used by arrangers,76 and that "[n]o
claim of originality can be based on their use, singly or in combi-
nation."77 Thus, the plaintiffs arrangement was found unworthy
of protection.
The substantiality test enunciated in Decca is far more liberal
than the test the court actually applied. At first glance, a "distinc-
67. See id. at 876 ("The defendant urges with much truth that both his own and the
complainant's songs are in the lowest grade of the musical art.").
68. Id.
69. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). The court stated that "[plerhaps the best test to be applied in determining
originality is to inquire whether the composition is a new and different treatment of an old
... melody or is merely a colorable attempt to use someone else's work as the composer's
own." Id.
70. Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D. Cal.
1950).
71. Id.
72. Id at 911. The court also identified "certain expressions which have been referred
to as jive expressions, such asyeah, dog, solid, and the like, which are not called for in the
song as written." Id. at 912 (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 912.
74. Id. at 905.
75. Id. at 908 (emphasis deleted).
76. Id. at 911.
77. Id
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tive characteristic" test would not seem especially strict. But the
court's application of that test-effectively denying copyright to
any arrangement that applies, "singly or in combination," com-
mon arranging techniques-is a test that requires the unorthodox.
In this respect, the Decca standard is more stringent than the mere
mechanic test; under the latter, at least, an arranger was rewarded
for skill or complexity. But under Decca, an arranger must em-
ploy techniques not commonly used by his peers.
Once again, a court is focusing on the individual elements of a
work when it should be examining the combination of those ele-
ments. The Decca court placed undue emphasis on the common-
ness of the arranging techniques. In assessing the distinctiveness
of an arrangement, it is not which techniques an arranger uses but
how he uses them that matters.7"
3. Emphasis on Melodic Analysis
Courts exhibit a great tendency in many copyright cases to fo-
cus solely on melody in assessing the originality of.a work.7 9
Other musical elements, such as rhythm and harmony, have been
ignored by courts as having negligible impact on originality.80
One court described rhythm as "tempo,"8 1 and harmony as simply
"the blending of tones" for which rules have long been estab-
78. Ultimately, plaintiff may have lost by attempting to assert original, as opposed to
derivative, copyright protection. It appears that plaintiff was not content to secure protec-
tion for the individual qualities of its arrangement; rather, it sued on an unfair competition
theory, seeking both damages and an injunction against further distribution of defendant's
arrangement. Id. at 906. The court found marked differences between the two arrange-
ments, and rejected the unfair competition claim as groundless. Id. at 912-13. While its
result was probably correct, the court displayed a preference for the ornate over the simple
which may have colored its decision. It found plaintiff's recording "thin, mechanical, lack-
ing in inspiration, containing just the usual accompaniments and the usual intonations
which one would find in any common recording." Id. at 912. The more complex orches-
tration and fuller harmonization of defendant's recording gave it a "full, meaty, polished"
sound, id., easily distinguishable from the plaintiff's arrangement. The reason these two
arrangements were so distinguishable may be that they were in two different styles. From
the court's description, plaintiff's work seemed to be in a bebop style, defendant's in a more
romantic style (commonly dubbed "dentist's chair music"). In assessing the differences
between the two arrangements, the court neglected to consider stylistic factors.
79. See, e.g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1923); Bright Tunes Mu-
sic Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Northern Music
Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Hein v. Harris, 175
F. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); Jollie v. Jacques, 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No.
7437).
80. E.g., Northern Music, 105 F. Supp. at 400.
81. Id.
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lished.s2 The court baldly concluded that "[i]t is in the melody
. . . that originality must be found." 3
The court clearly misunderstood these musical terms.84 More-
over, courts generally fail to grasp the interdependence of har-
mony, rhythm, and melody." Harmony often dictates the melo-
dic options available to a composer,86 and the harmonic progres-
sion frequently defines the contours of the melody.87 This is espe-
cially true when an unaccompanied solo instrument or voice is
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Rhythm is by no means synonymous with tempo. Tempo is overall pace--the fast-
ness or slowness of a piece-whereas rhythm is the progression in time of a composition
and the time relationship of one note to another note within the composition. For instance,
the rhythm:
-J . J -j I 21 f J
can be played in a slow or fast tempo.
Harmony is not simply a "blending of tones," nor have its rules been established for
many years. It is one of the essential elements of a piece, lending structure, drive, and
movement to the music. Harmony has continuously evolved over the centuries, and re-
mains in a tate bf flux. The instant case was decided while Paul Hindemith, who helped
establish a harmony built on fourths instead of traditional thirds, was still living. Thus,
even as the court was describing it as settled, harmony was undergoing an extraordinary
evolution. Even traditional harmonic "rules" are not rules so much as common usages.
These usages set up small progressions and have numerous exceptions. It takes originality
and creativity to invent larger progressions.
85. By stating that "neither rhythm nor harmony can in itself be the subject of copy-
right," 105 F. Supp. at 400, the court made clear its ignorance of the interrelationship of
harmony, rhythm, and melody.
86. An inappropriate melody with harmony can give rise to dissonance. Below is a
dissonant harmonization of a melody:
M. Mussorgsky, Promenade, Mvt. I, meas. 1-2, from Pictures at an Exhibition (1874) (dis-
sonant harmonization by Ronald P. Smith).
87. Bach's unaccompanied violin sonatas are an excellent example of this:
NT PT PT
I1 ,~ ~ .. .. . .... ! ._ k . . .. .
i iv V /iv III iv-
7 6 7
3
Key: B Minor
J.S. Bach, Partita no. 1 in B minor for unaccompanied violin, BWV 1002, Sarabande-
Double, meas. 1-3 (1720).
1983] 0PRGINALITY IN A FINITE SYSTEM 119
used because the composer must impy the harmony through the
melodic line.88 Rhythm adds greater definition to the melody and
is capable of changing the whole character of a piece.89 If a
rhythmic figure is well conceived, it can be the dominant element
of a composition.9"
An important development occurred in Desclee & Cie, S.A. v.
Nemmers,91 where the court recognized the significance of
rhythm. The plaintiff had translated medieval plainsong
neumes92 into modem rhythmic notation with the assistance of the
Abbey of Solesmes.93 The defendant photocopied the plaintiff's
work and the plaintiff brought suit, alleging unfair competition. 94
While the court rejected the unfair competition claim,95 it stated
88. See id
89. The Turkish March variation of the Choral Movement of Beethoven's Ninth Sym-
phony is an excellent example of this.
Original statement of theme is a songlike melody:
L. von Beethoven, Symphony no. 9 in D Minor, op. 125, Mvt. IV, meas. 92-95 (1824)
(transposed to B-Flat Major).
The fourth variation is a rhythmic variation, which adds brightness and charm to the
original representation of the theme:
- I . , I : -
I)_ - : .  %:- 7 ' , l I -l
- 1*' ! " " i .. '-i
Id. at meas. 339-51 (piano reduction by Michael A. Walsh).
90. The motif of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is as well-recognized for its rhythm of
three short and one long notes as for its melodic content.
91. 190 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
92. Neumes are medieval musical notation. D. GROUT, supra note 57, at 41.
93. 190 F. Supp. at 383.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 386-89. Curiously, plaintiff did not sue on traditional copyright grounds.
See Note, Copyright and the MusicalArrangement, 7 PEPPERDINB L. Rav. 125, 135 (1979).
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that the rhythmic notations were "an integral part of the piece"
and, as such, were worthy of copyright protection.96 In recogniz-
ing rhythm as an "integral" part of the work, the court expanded
the concept of substantiality. Although the decision has been crit-
icized,97 it was a positive first step in recognizing that rhythmic, as
well as melodic and harmonic, modifications can make a substan-
tial contribution to the originality of a derivative work.
By focusing on the differences between original and derivative
works rather than on the level of skill exercised by an arranger,
the substantiality test represented progress over the mere mechan-
ic test in analyzing the originality of derivative works. The test
had limited value, however, since "substantiality" was susceptible
to widely varying interpretations. Moreover, the test encouraged
the instinctive tendency of courts to award copyright protection to
ornate, rather than faithful, interpretations of an original.9 Fi-
nally, the test placed a myopic emphasis on melody as the sole
source of a work's originality,9 9 largely ignoring the equally im-
portant elements of harmony and rhythm. 1°°
C. Trivial Variation Test
A much more lenient standard was first expounded in Marks v.
Leo Feist, Inc. 101 The case involved two pieces with basically the
same melody.10 2 The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement,
but the court decided that the different beat and accent of the sec-
ond work precluded an infringement claim. 103 The court adopted
a standard that denied an infringement action so long as the sec-
96. 190 F. Supp. at 388.
97. See Note, supra note 95, at 135.
98. See supra note 78.
99. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
100. But see Desclee, 190 F. Supp. 381 (isolated exception). See supra notes 91-97 and
accompanying text.
101. 290 F. 959 (2d Cir. 1923).
102. Id. at 959-60.
103. Id. at 960. Even though there were some rhythmic differences, the six measures
that appear below would have the same basic effect:
Music from Sherman, supra note 34, at 128.
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ond piece did not-fargely copy the first." 4 While it is questionable
whether this was the appropriate standard for an infringement suit
brought by an original composer, the trivial variation test was
viewed more favorably in later cases involving public domain
works.
Much of the progress in developing this standard occurred in
areas other than music. Gelles- Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley
Co. 105 involved the photocopying of mathematical flash cards
used for the teaching of basic math skills. The court found that
while the numbers themselves were obviously in the public do-
main, their arrangement on the flash cards was a "distinguishable
variation" warranting copyright protection."° Donald v. Uarco
Business Forms1 7 later expanded this language to allow the copy-
right of legal forms as long as there was a "trivial variation." 10
8
The court in Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley Pub-
lications, Inc. I09 was the first to apply the trivial variation stan-
dard to public domain music. The plaintiff had published a book
for beginning pianists called Easy Classics to Moderns, which con-
sisted mostly of works in the public domain.' 10 The plaintit's edi-
tion added editorial markings for fingering, phrasing, and
dynamics."' The defendant copied the work note for note, in-
cluding several mistakes which were in the plaintiff's edition." 2
In determining whether a copyright could subsist in plaintiff's edi-
tion of the public domain music, the court applied the trivial vari-
ation test 1 3 and held that copyright protection is warranted where
the plaintiff has contributed "'at least a modicum of creative
104. 290 F. at 960. Thus, plaintiffs copyright did not preclude defendant's use of 6
similar bars out of a composition of 450 bars. Id.
105. 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963).
106. Id. at 146-47.
107. 478 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1973). In Uarco, plaintiff created a legal form from his
knowledge of legal forms in the public domain, using standard legal language. One of
plaintiff's customers asked defendant printer to print some forms. Defendant printed iden-
tical copies of plaintiff's form, and plaintiff sued for copyright infringement. The court held
that plaintiff's form did not exhibit the minimum requisite degree of creativity and origi-
nality to warrant copyright protection.
108. Id. at 766.
109. 197 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
110. Id. at 17.
111. Id.
112. Id at 18-19.
113. Id. at 18. In adopting the test, the court relied on Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
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work.' 114 Under the copyright statute, however, the plaintiff is
protected only to the extent of its editorial additions;"-' the copy-
right in this case would only cover the fingering and other mark-
ings added by the plaintiff, not the public domain music itself.
The trivial variation test was further refined in Plymouth Music
Co. v. Magnus Organ Corp.,"16 where fifteen public domain
songs-including "Holiday Polka" and "Come to the Sta-
ble"-had been specially arranged by plaintiffs for use with the
defendant's chord organs." 7 Relying on Affred Bell & Co. v. Cat-
alda Fine Arts, Inc. ,"' the court held that derivations of public
domain works need only represent a "'distinguishable variation'"
to warrant protection." 9 In upholding the plaintiffs' copyright,
the court stated that originality in the context of derivative works
"'means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.' ",120
This test is quite broad, but not unnecessarily so. It removes
from the public domain only that material which the author actu-
ally contributes.1 21 Moreover, it does not immerse the court in
difficult questions of originality and creativity-which, judging
from the courts' unfamiliarity with technical musical terms,"
would seem to be a desirable goal.
III. TAKING Music OUT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
As Carte v. Dufft23 demonstrated, the rigid distinction between
original and derivative works could once force a composition into
the public domain.' 2 This section of the Note examines judicial
standards for removing works from the public domain.
A. Music Derivedfrom Folksongs
In Italian Book Co. v. Rossi, 21 an Italian sailor who could not
114. 197 F. Supp. at 18 (quoting Andrews v. Guenther Publishing Co., 60 F.2d 555, 557
(S.D.N.Y. 1932)).
115. This was finally made clear in 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). See supra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text.
116. 456 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
117. Id. at 678.
118. 191 F.2d at 102-03.
119. 456 F. Supp. at 679 (quoting Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102).
120. Id. (quotingAlfredBell, 191 F.2d at 103); see Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C.
Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 34, 41 & 84.
123. 25 F. 183 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
124. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
125. 27 F. 2d 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
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read music "learned" a song which he had heard when growing
up. What he could not remember he filled in.126 The piece was
later written down by a publisher and enjoyed great success. 127
The defendant, who copied the song, argued that since the origi-
nal folksong recalled by the sailor was in the public domain no
claim for infringement could be brought. 2 8
The court found differences between the sailor's composition
and other versions of the folksong, 2 9 but it did not pursue those
differences for evidence of any original contribution by the
sailor. 30 Rather, it found significance in the popularity of the
sailor's version. The court reasoned that in reviving the popular-
ity of the old song, the sailor "must" have added something origi-
nal to it-of sufficient originality to warrant copyright
protection.' 3' By using this analysis, the court assessed originality
not by reference to the work itself, but by inferring it from public
response.
This popularity analysis was later endorsed in Wihtol v.
Wells, 132 where the plaintiff had composed a choral version of a
folksong he recalled from childhood. 133 The significance of W-
tol is that the court granted copyright protection not only to the
material added by plaintiff but to the public domain melody he
recalled.' 34 This was a striking departure from Italian Book,
which left the defendants free to compose their own variations of
the folksong.13
5
In both cases, the original folksong was only vaguely
remembered by the composer. 36 While the Italian Book court
126. Id. at 1014. It is difficult to discern how one can "learn" a song that one already
knew. In fact, the use of the term "learn" to describe the process by which the sailor pro-
duced the song in question is a strong indication that the song was already in existence
when the sailor wrote it. He did not compose a piece, but learned an existing work.
127. Id.
128. Id
129. Id
130. The court even stated that "no one can say" how much of the work was original.
Id.
131. See id. ("There must have been something which Citorello [the sailor] added
which brought the old song back into popularity with his own people in this country, and
sufficient, I think, to support his claim of copyright.").
132. 231 F.2d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 1956).
133. Id. at 551.
134. Id. at 554.
135. 27 F.2d at 1014.
136. This may have been what produced the inconsistent results. Because the original
folksongs were inaccessible, the courts could not accurately determine the originality of the
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found originality only in the sailor's additions to the song, 137 the
Wihtol court found originality in the plaintiff's setting the melody
down on paper.138  Despite the plaintiff's boyhood memory of the
song, the court deemed it an "original work on the plaintiffs part
when, some thirty years later, he devised a calculated melody
score. . . for all to read."' 139 Although the plaintiff may well have
made original contributions to the folksong in arranging it for cho-
rus, it is difficult to see how he could be granted protection for the
melody 140 -especially on the basis of merely having preserved it.
1. Problems in Allocating Copyright Protection
Wihtol raises questions about the proper allocation of copy-
right protection in the context of folk music. Generally, folksongs
are published through the efforts of two people, an informer and a
collector. 141 The informer is the native source of the song, the one
who gives the tune to the collector. 142 The informer is granted no
copyright on the melody because he has not fixed it in a tangible
form, such as notation or recording. 4 3 The collector, on the other
hand, can usually obtain a copyright.'" The policy behind this
disparity of treatment is to reward the collector for the time and
effort expended in searching out and recording a piece.145 Others
have suggested that the collector should be treated as any other
researcher. They argue that the discovery of a song should be
treated like the uncovering of a historical fact, for.which the col-
lector has no copyright claim."'1
derivative works. This uncertainty seems to have caused the Witol court to grant broader
protection than it might otherwise have.
137. 27 F.2d at 1014.
138. 231 F.2d at 554.
139. Id.
140. Indeed, plaintiff admitted that his choral arrangement contained a public domain
melody. Id. at 553-54.
141. Sometimes, however, both functions are performed by the same person.
142. Coon, supra note 50, at 212.
143. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) ("Copyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .....
144. Coon, supra note 50, at 213.
145. Id. at 213-15.
146. See, e.g., id. at 214.
Some courts have given copyright protection to an author's presentation of facts. The
rationale has been that courts should protect the labor expended by an author in his re-
search. In Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1950), the court
held that the translation of a public domain work is copyrightable. Maps were given copy-
right protection when they evinced "a great deal of skill, labor, and expense." General
Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1930). On the other hand, the Zapruder
photographs of the Kennedy assassination were denied copyright protection because "there
[Vol. 34:104
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This debate brings up the fundamental question of the art
form: Is music sound or is it the written notes? For evidentiary
purposes, it is clear why the current copyright statute requires the
element of fixation. 47 But to say that a work which is admitted to
have been in the public domain suddenly exists as a new work,
copyrightable in its entirety, overlooks the fact that'the end result
of the copyrighted work, the musical sound itself, may well have
been in the public domain for centuries. Would a visiting song
and dance troupe from Latvia be liable for infringement of Wih-
tol's hymn if they sang the original version they learned as chil-
dren? Could the informer of a folk tune be enjoined from
teaching the song to a second collector if the first had already
copyrighted his version?
2. The Need For Consistent Application of the Current Copyright
Statute
These questions are best answered by consistently applying the
current statute. This would allow copyright for the particular ex-
pression 148 (even compilation) of a work, thus rewarding the col-
lector for his efforts. On the other hand, it would not give the
author a monopoly on a melody borrowed from the public do-
main. Copyright should not cover part of a nation's cultural heri-
tage unless the author has composed that part.
is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of [the Presi-
dent]." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The cases involving maps and translations are distinguishable from those involving folk
music in that folk music offers limited opportunities for independent access. A willing
translator can usually be found for a public domain work. The source of a map is well
defined and is usually accessible (although sometimes at great cost). The problem with
public domain music is that it is often impossible to identify the source of the material so as
to enable another person to obtain the original. "John Smith, on a hill in Kentucky," for
example, would not be a sufficiently precise citation to allow access by other researchers to
the source of the music. Moreover, unlike public domain documents which can be pre-
served, many of the sources of public domain music are dying out. One example is "Simple
Gifts," a Shaker folksong. The Shakers are gradually fading out of existence. The great
American composer Aaron Copland has used the tune in several of his works (e.g., ."Appa-
lachian Spring," and several arrangements of the song). If the Shakers die out before Cop-
land's copyright expires, will he have the exclusive rights to the tune? Does it not make
more sense to treat the tune as a historical fact and give Copland protection only for his
individual expression of it?
147. See supra note 143.
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
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B. Musical Elements in the Public Domain. Judicial
Inconsistency as a Product of False Assumptions and
Misconceptions
Traditional western music employs twelve tones 149 arranged in
a succession which, to a degree, is dictated by harmony. 5 ' In
some popular music, the average performer's instrumental or vo-
cal ability imposes further restrictions on a composer. 5' Within
this finite system, courts have struggled to identify and define
originality.
1. Melody
It should be the goal of copyright law to protect works of even
modest originality, while preventing the removal of basic musical
building blocks from the public domain. The problem is how to
determine where the building blocks of music end and originality
begins. Since many courts determine originality solely by refer-
ence to melody, the question may be phrased as follows: what is
the simplest melody to which copyright can be granted? Line-
drawing is not the answer. Submitted are two examples. In one,
the commercial for Muehlebach Brewery, a two-note theme was
deemed unworthy of copyright; in the other, a three-note theme
was considered sufficiently original to warrant protection.
The Muehlebach Brewery commercial used two notes, c-g, and
the lyrics "Tic Toc, Tic Toc, Time for Muehlebach" set to a clock-
like rhythm.' 52 The court decided that composition of this two-
note jingle was merely a mechanical exercise unworthy of copy-
right protection.' Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music,
Ltd 114 involved a three-note theme from George Harrison's "My
Sweet Lord" which was claimed to be an infringement of Ronald
Mack's "He's So Fine."' 155
A three-note pattern (consisting of a descending minor third
interval followed by a descending major second interval) is the
melodic motif with which both the Harrison piece and the Mack
piece begin. After several repetitions of this motif, each piece then
149. See supra note 1.
150. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
151. Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923).
152. Smith v. George E. Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729, 730 (W.D. Mo.
1956).
153. Id. at 731-32. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
154. 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
155. Id. at 178.
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proceeds with the same three-note pattern in its retrograde inver-
sion (i.e., the motif is turned upside down and backwards):
Motif A 
1 56
Wi1 M2
Retrograde Inversion
M2 W13
In its analysis, the court stated that Mack's "He's So Fine" con-
sisted of "four repetitions of a very short musical phrase, 'sol-mi-
re' [which it referred to as motif A], altered as necessary to fit the
words, followed by four repetitions of another short basic musical
phrase, 'sol-la-do-la-do' [which it referred to as motif B]."' 1 57
Motif B 158
In comparing Mack's piece to Harrison's, the court noted that
"My Sweet Lord" used "the same motif A (modified to suit the
words) four times, followed by motif B, repeated three times, not
four." 59
Despite the permutations identified by the court, the melody in
Bright Tunes is merely the natural outgrowth of a basic three-note
motif. Motif B, a retrograde inversion of motif A, is a closely re-
lated product of the structure of motif A. Moreover, this simple
melody is largely dictated by the harmony. 160 Both songs con-
tained only a two-chord harmonic progression: the repetition of a
minor ii and a Major V chord.' 61 The melody is a bare outline of
the underlying harmony. The repetition of la-do in motif B does
little more than sustain the melodic outline of the harmony. The
court failed to recognize not only the dependence of the melody
on the harmony, but also that the whole melody is a natural out-
growth of a basic three-note motif. r
Muehlebach involved a two-note melody comprised of a basic
156. See id. at 178 n.1.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 178 n.2. Compare this motif with the figure labeled "Retrograde Inver-
sion," supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
159. 420 F. Supp. at 178.
160. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
161. 420 F. Supp. at 179.
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musical building block: a fifth.'6 2 The court in Bright Tunes was
confronted with a three-note motif which gave the skeletal outline
of some basic harmonic language. This is not to say that the mel-
ody in Bright Tunes exhibited no originality. A basic harmonic
progression presents a composer with more choices than does a
simple interval (e.g., a fifth). For instance, to outline the minor ii
chord, Mack could have chosen any of four notes. He specifically
chose two notes and placed them in a specific order: sol-mi.163
Though not a work of great sophistication, it does display some
originality and artistic choice. It represents a first step from
straight application of musical building blocks, as in Muehlebach,
toward a level of artistic decisionmaking which evinces
originality.
2. Sliding Scale of Protection
The works in Bright Tunes and Muehlebach stand at opposite
ends of a gray area between originality and the public domain
building blocks of musical language. The Muehlebach jingle, in
setting the relationship of a fifth to lyrics, was almost a straight
application of public domain elements. "He's So Fine" exhibited
greater artistic choice than the jingle, but in merely outlining a
two-chord progression it was not manifestly original. These two
works define a gray area through which no bright lines of
copyrightability should be drawn. Rather than making a stark dis-
tinction between protection and nonprotection, courts should use
a sliding scale in addressing such works. They should tailor the
scope of protection to the extent of a work's originality. The
closer a work comes to straight application of musical building
blocks, the more limited should be its scope of protection.
Extending any protection to the Muehlebach Brewery com-
mercial creates a danger of removing musical building blocks
from the public domain. Nevertheless, the unique combination of
a public domain element with lyrics is worthy of limited protec-
tion-perhaps only a proscription against direct copying.' 64
The melody in "He's So Fine" is a basic outline of a two-chord
progression. It is not the only possible accompaniment to the har-
mony, but it is a simple, logical accompaniment. It could conceiv-
162. See supra note 41.
163. Although the court refers to the harmony as a minor ii chord, 420 F. Supp. at 179,
from the melody it is obvious that the chord was a minor ii7 . A minor ii7 chord consists of
the notes: a-c-e-g. In motif A, Mack chose e-g (sol-mi).
164. See supra text following note 41.
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ably be stumbled upon by anyone repeating the minor ii and
Major V chord. 165 Even with melodic fragments closely related to
one another and to underlying harmonies, originality must be re-
warded by protection. 66 But such protection must take into ac-
count the possibility that someone may independently compose
this simple melody. In awarding copyright protection to works of
limited originality, the protection should be limited to the extent
of that originality. Thus, George Harrison's "My Sweet Lord"
should have been found an infringement of "He's So Fine" only if
intentional copying could be proved. 167
The final group of works to be considered are those in which
originality is self-evident due to the work's complexity and the
circumstances of its composition. Such pieces should be afforded
complete copyright protection-the presumption would be against
accidental copying. As the complexity of a work increases, the
likelihood of an accidental copying diminishes-and the defend-
ant's access168 to the original work can more readily be presumed.
165. The Bright Tunes court noted that the melody "germinated" as Harrison was re-
peating the minor ii and Major V chord. 420 F. Supp. at 179.
166. Melodies are often short fragments that a composer develops to give the appear-
ance of a longer melodic strand. These fragments can also be the germinating ideas for
larger works. In the first movement of Brahms's Fourth Symphony, for example, the inter-
val of a sixth is developed throughout the entire movement. The longer the melody and the
less simplistic the relationship of latter fragments in the strand to earlier fragments, the
greater the likelihood that copyright may subsist solely in the melodic element.
167. The court in Bright Tunes concluded that George Harrison did not intentionally
copy the melody of "He's So Fine." Instead, it decided that Harrison took the melody
subconsciously. 420 F. Supp. at 180. Through an inquiry that almost amounted to psycho-
analysis, the court decided that Harrison had picked the melody not because he liked it and
thought it would be popular, but because his subconscious knew it had been popular before
and told his conscious self to pick it. Id.
The court's assertions regarding Harrison's subconscious machinations were at best
vague conjectures. Moreover, they failed to take into account the extraordinary changes in
popular music and taste that occurred between the composition of these two works. Thus, it
was groundless to assert that Harrison's subconscious knew that a melody which was popu-
lar before would be popular again. Indeed, the subconscious taking analysis seems so spec-
ulative as to be inherently unreliable.
"My Sweet Lord" may very well have been copied intentionally. The coincidence of
common structure, melody, and ornamentation is certainly remarkable. What is suprising
is that, conceding Harrison had no intent to copy "He's So Fine," the court nevertheless
gave complete protection to Mack's relatively simple melody.
168. Establishing copying by direct evidence is generally impossible, since the plaintiff
rarely can produce a witness to the act of copying. Thus, copying is ordinarily established
indirectly by proof of access and substantial similarity. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RiGHT § 13.01[B], at 5-6 (1983).
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3. Other Musical Elements
The protection of public domain building blocks does not ap-
ply only to melody, but to other musical elements as well. In
Shaw v. Time-Lfe Records,169 big band leader Artie Shaw
brought an unfair competition suit against Time-Life Records for
using his arrangements of big band "classics," claiming that the
distinctiveness of the arrangements contributed to the "Artie
Shaw 'sound.' "70 The court decided that the arrangements were
not distinctive enough and that no property interest could be had
in the basic style of a performer. 7'
But some stylistic elements are so distinctive and original that
they warrant protection. 7 2 Following the acclaim for the music
from Chariots of Fire,'73 for example, many commercials emu-
lated the simple melodic line of a solo piano, sometimes accompa-
nied by a pulsating synthesizer beat. Much of this imitation
would probably not be considered an infringement under Shaw
on the theory of promoting dissemination of innovative styles.
But if the melody is so similar and the texture of the music for the
commercial compostions further suggests the original Vangelis
composition, a cause of action might very well lie under the dis-
tinctive quality rationale of Decca Records,'7 4 since the combina-
tion of texture and melody produces the impression of the original
work.
169. 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975).
170. Id. at 205, 341 N.E.2d at 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
171. Id. at 205-06, 341 N.E.2d at 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 394. The Shaw court cited with
approval an earlier New York case, Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., I I A.D.2d 47, 201
N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960), aj§'d, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 248, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1962), in
which the widow of orchestra leader Glenn Miller unsuccessfully claimed a property inter-
est in the Glenn Miller "sound." The defendant had re-created the Glenn Miller "sound"
by hiring and training an orchestra for the movie The Glenn Miller Story. The court stated
that the plaintiff "never had, and certainly does not now have, any property interest in the
Glenn Miller 'sound.' Indeed, in the absence of palming off or confusion, even while
Glenn Miller was alive, others might have meticulously duplicated or imitated his rendi-
tions." 11 A.D.2d at 49, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
172. Although the Shaw case was decided prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright
Act, courts continue to rely on its rationale. See eg., Gee v. CBS, 471 F. Supp. 600, 611,
660-61 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (heirs of blues singer claimed that their rights in her singing style
were abridged when defendant reissued recordings several decades later, court held no
such protection to performers existed under applicable state law).
173. V. PAP'ATHANASSIOUS (Vangelis), CHARIOTS OF FIRE (Polydor Records, Ltd.
1981).
174. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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IV. EXPERT VS. REASONABLE PERSON: THE SEARCH FOR AN
APPROPRIATE MUSICAL YARDSTICK
Although most copyright courts rely on expert testimony, they
disagree as to the proper extent of this reliance. The problem
arises in the context of two different inquiries: whether an in-
fringement has actually occurred, and the extent of the in-
fringement.
The Jollie v. Jacques court, "75 in formulating a reasonable per-
son standard, declared that a musical piece is an infringement if
"the ear detects the same [melody] in the new arrangement." '76
By this vague standard, Mozart's Piano Concerto in C Major, K.
503, and Tchaikovsky's 1812 Overture, op. 49, are the same ar-
rangement of the French national anthem, the "Marseillaise."'
177
This standard was relaxed to a small degree in Hein v. Harris,1 7 1
where the court said that an infringement may be found if the two
pieces sound the same to an average person.179
The courts in Supreme Records v. Decca Records?80 and MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson 181 allowed the reasonable person to decide whether
arrangements were "distinctive" enough to warrant copyright;' 82
175. 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
176. Id. at 913. The Jollie court noted that such a determination will often require
persons with ordinary musical skill and expertise to assist the court and jury. Id. at 914.
177. Compare the "Marseillaise" tune with the very similar melody in Mozart's Piano
Concerto in C Major, K. 503.
The "Marseillaise":
W.A. Mozart, Concerto no. 25 in C Major, K. 503, for piano and orchestra, Mvt. I,
meas. 230-34 (1786):
EK--
See also P. Tchaikovsky, 1812 Overture, op. 49, meas. 229-39, 263-69, 307-13 (1882).
178. 175 F. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
179. Id. at 877.
180. 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
181. 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
182. The court in Decca Records stated that "[u]ltimately, the Judge, rather than at-
tempting to resolve the different interpretations by musically trained listeners, must deter-
mine the question by putting himself in the position of the average person who would listen
to the two records and determine whether such person would confound [one] with the other
.... 90 F. Supp. at 912. The Wison court adopted a similar theory, stating that observa-
1983]
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the Italian Book court allowed the mass of reasonable people (i.e.,
popularity) to determine the originality of an arrangement.'83
Most courts do rely on expert testimony to a great extent, since
it is often essential in producing sufficient evidence. Sometimes
the expert testimony is specifically mentioned; often it takes the
form of judicial notice. 8 4 Even the Hein court,' 85 despite its pro-
motion of a rational person standard, relied on the analysis of ex-
perts to identify differences in musical arrangements. 86 While
these developments do not represent an abandonment of the rea-
sonable person standard, they seem to allow the reasonable person
to weigh his own assessment of a piece's originality against expert
opinion.
A. The Dangers Inherent in Note Counting
Expert testimony often focuses on "note counting" of the me-
lodic element. The notes of the infringing melody are lined up
and compared with the notes of the "original" melody. Notes
which fall in approximately the same place are then counted.
This technique was used extensively in Selle v. Gibb,'87 a recent
infringement suit against the popular group, the Bee Gees. The
Bee Gees were accused of copying the song of an amateur musi-
cian for use in the movie Saturday Night Fever.
To prove the extent to which the two pieces were similar, both
parties compared and counted notes in the closing melody lines.' 88
The defense also presented note-counting comparisons between
the melodies at issue and several other popular and classical
pieces, including Handel's "Judas Maccabaeus," Donizetti's
"L'Eliser D'Amore," the coda from the Second Movement of Bee-
tions of audiences were clearly relevant evidence because "one of the crucial tests in a
copyright infringement case is whether the allegedly infringing work is recognizable by
ordinary observation as having been pirated from the copyrighted source.. ." 425 F.
Supp. at 450.
183. 27 F.2d 1014, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
184. Eg., Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (court took
judicial notice of meaning of term "ostinato," i.e., constantly repeated musical figure).
185. 175 F. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
186. Id. at 876; cf. id at 877 (court noted that opinion of musically deft state supreme
court justice corroborated its conclusion).
187. 567 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-2484 (7th Cir. Aug. 11,
1983).
188. See 1d. at 1175, 1177-78 (discussing plaintiff's expert testimony on note compari-
sons); Defendants' Post-Trial Exhibit A, Reply Memorandum of Defendants Submitted in
Support of Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, New Trial, or Section
1292(b) Certificate, Selle (demonstrating contrary interpretation of same note comparison).
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thoven's Fifth Symphony, and the Beatles' "Get Back." '89 The
jury, having heard the evidence as to numerical note counting and
having listened to the melodies, determined that the Bee Gees'
composition constituted an infringement. 190
Note counting is appealing to triers of fact because it has the
outward appearance of a simple, systematic mechanism for un-
veiling the truth. The procedure, however, is highly susceptible to
manipulation. Depending on the manner in which the notes are
counted, the same musical passages can produce an almost per-
verse variety of results.
In Selle v. Gibb, for example, the defendants argued that the
initial musical material at bars 1-4 of their composition contained
only ten notes out of a possible twenty-two that fell within the
same pitch and rhythmic pattern as those found in the comparable
portion of plaintiffs piece, and that there were only four such
notes out of a possible twenty-five in bars 5-8:
Bars 1-4191
Bars 5-8192
,1[ V V t I I P
This interpretation is deceptive for several reasons. The statement
that there are twenty-two notes in the melody line at bars 1-4 ig-
nores the fact that on three occasions a note is "tied" to the subse-
quent note. A "tie" between two consecutive notes that are
identical in pitch signifies that instead of two discrete tones there
189. See Affidavit of Harold Barlow, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Selle.
190. See 567 F. Supp. at 1177-79. Through his experts' note and rhythmic compari-
sons, plaintiff sought to prove that defendants' song was "so strikingly similar to the plain-
tiff's as to preclude coincidence, independent creation, or prior source." Id. at 1175. In
contrast, defendants presented evidence of nonaccess and independent creation. Id. The
court found plaintiff's evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, and granted de-
fendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 1183-84.
191. Defendants' Post-Trial Exhibit A, Reply Memorandum of Defendants Submitted
in Support of Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, New Trial, or section
1292(b) Certificate, Selle.
192. Id.
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will be one continuous sound. Recognition of this practical inci-
dent of musical notation is crucial because the ear perceives only
nineteen notes-not twenty-two. The proposition that merely ten
out of twenty-two notes are the same thus overstates the case. (A
similar discrepancy arises out of the claim that there are twenty-
five notes in bars 5-8.) Assuming that as the fraction becomes
larger the evidence of plagiarism grows more convincing, it is little
wonder that the defense chose the largest denominator possible.
Nor is it any wonder that the defense chose to use the number of
notes found in its own melody (allegedly twenty-two) instead of
the number contained in plaintiff's melody (sixteen), since ten
notes out of sixteen (10/16) might be said-under this mode of
analysis, at least-to suggest plagiarism more strongly than would
10/22.
The fact that the two melodies do not contain an equal
number of notes adds yet another layer of perplexity to the "sim-
ple" note-counting method. It is meaningless to declare that one
melody but not the other should provide the number of notes
against which the identical notes are compared.
Regardless of competing interpretations, the primary weakness
in any note-counting scheme is the faulty assumption that music
can be identified merely by reference to the arrangement of pitch
and rhythm in a melodic line. Other musical elements such as
timbre, tempo, presence of additional melodic lines, register, har-
mony, and dynamics can significantly alter musical identity.'93
Given that a composition's "personality" is a function of more
than just pitch and rhythm, it is difficult to compare two pieces
meaningfully within the vacuum of note counting. The weakness
in its underlying assumption renders note counting a highly sus-
pect test for infringement.
Moreover, it is questionable whether this type of expert testi-
mony really advances the jurors' understanding of the music
before them. The technique of melodic note counting tells the ju-
ror only why pieces sound alike, not how original they are-and
originality is what copyright seeks to protect. 194 Once the piece is
played and the notes are counted, the jury is no more equipped to
understand the testimony regarding the originality and complexity
193. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
194. Thus, the court in Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir.
1943), considered "dissection" or "technical analysis" by itself to be an insufficient means
of determining plagiarism.
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of the compositional techniques that were used. 195
B. The Reasonable Person as the Ultimate Consumer
Nevertheless, the final determination of the substantiality of
an infringement is left to the discretion of jurors.196 The rationale
behind this procedure is that the average consumer is most quali-
fied to judge whether one piece infringes on another. But this is
only half true. Before a piece gets to the consumer, a performer or
record producer first chooses an arrangement of the piece.' 97 In
choosing one arrangement over another, the performer or pro-
ducer may detect differences that would go unnoticed by consum-
ers.198 If an arranger whose version was rejected by the performer
sues for infringement, should not the expert performer's assess-
ment of the differences between the arrangements be given greater
weight than that of a lay juror, who may be incapable of discern-
ing any differences at all? This argument is even more compelling
in the context of editions of public domain music, where the
purchase is often made or promoted by experts.' 99 Without expert
testimony, the reasonable person is simply not in a position to as-
sess the substantiality of differences between derivative works.
V. ALTERNATIVES AND SUGGESTIONS
In virtually every case discussed in this Note, the actual music
at issue is conspicuously absent.2" Upon examining the music in
conitroversy, one is often incredulous that the court was addressing
the same composition. 20 1 The author recognizes that many people
do not read music or know its terminology. But just as courts
must be familiar with amortization and capital gains in discussing
tax, they must be familiar with notes and chords in discussing mu-
195. See, eg., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(disapproving the way in which the "tinny tintinnabulations of the [pianist's affidavits]
resounded throughout the United States Courthouse to the exclusion of all else, including
the real issues in the case.").
196. Id. at 473 & n.22 (Clark, J., dissenting).
197. S. SHEMEL & W. KRASiLOVSKY, THIS BusINEss OF Music 208 (rev. ed. 1977).
198. Typically, the arranger's fee is not contingent on the recording's popularity. He is
often paid a flat sum by the producer or the artist. See id.
199. The "experts" referred to in this instance are advanced musicians and/or their
teachers.
200. The only two cases cited herein which contain musical notation are Bright Tunes
and Decca Records.
201. The court in Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959 (2d Cir. 1923), for example,
would have permitted a separate copyright for a piece which merely varied the accent and
rhythm of the original melody. Id. at 960. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
136 CASE WESTERiV RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:104
sic. Including musical notations in copyright decisions would
greatly enhance the capacity of scholars to understand the reason-
ing of courts.
A. Editions of Public Domain Music
Editions of public domain music contain markings that a
layperson would probably deem the most trivial variations. These
markings include fingerings, dynamics, phrasing, and occasional
editorial comments. The copyrighting of such works has been
criticized in law reviews, 20 2 but to the average musician these
marks are vital. A difference in fingering (especially on a stringed
instrument) is often the difference between a mediocre perform-
ance and one of artistry.20 3 This is equally true of bowing and
202. See Note, supra note 95, at 135-36 (criticizing courts that grant copyright protec-
tion for musical compositions whose only points of variance from another composition are
phrasing and accent marks).
203. Fingering is the means by which an artist expresses his interpretation of a work. It
also provides practical instruction to facilitate the playing of difficult passages. In choosing
the fingering for even a single passage, the artist makes a wide variety of practical and
artistic decisions. Because of the originality and intellectual labor required in designing
them, fingerings are worthy of copyright protection. The thought processes involved can be
demonstrated by three possible fingerings for the violin passage below, each containing its
own set of technical and artistic considerations:
a) 111 3 21 12 *13 4 3 1] 3 1 2 1 2 3-2 12
b) 11 2 10 01 3 4 2 0 2 1111 2 1 2 3-2 12
c) I1 4 32 23 *Ill 2 2 0 2 1111 2 1 2 3-2 1
J.S. Bach (possibly J.G. Goldberg), Sonata in C Major for two violins and harpsichord,
BWV 1037, Mvt. I, meas. 3-4, 2d violin part (1741) (fingerings by Ronald P. Smith).
Roman numerals in violin notation are used to differentiate among the instrument's
four strings, where the G string = IV, D = III, A = II, and E = I. Arabic numerals
correspond to the digits of the left hand, where I = index finger and 0 = no finger (i.e.,
"open" string).
By starting with vibrato on the third finger and remaining on the same string at *
example (a) offers a richer sound and an even tonal quality. Unfortunately, this fingering
will produce a pinched sound in the higher register, is stylistically inauthentic, and requires
an extension (see brackets) which is technically awkward.
Example (b) is much safer, starting in a lower position (i.e., the left hand is closer to the
scroll of the violin). Although the lower position is more authentic for Baroque music, its
repetition of open strings is harsh and inauthentic. Since the phrase starts on the A
string-a higher, brighter string-it will be difficult for the performer to match tone color
and obtain the proper intensity when crossing to the D string.
Example (c) starts on the fourth finger. This is a very safe fingering, but will result in a
thin vibrato. The pad of the fourth finger (the pinky) is much smaller than the pad of the
third finger (ring finger); thus, a third finger vibrato is wider and richer. The switch to the
A string at * highlights the subphrase beginning there. Nonetheless, example (c) forces the
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articulation markings.2 4 The value of copyrighting editorial
markings is that it encourages publishers to employ great perform-
ers and teachers and incorporate their fingerings and other edito-
rial markings into musical scores. Thus, these traditions and
artistic innovations will not be lost to future generations.2 0 5
Extending copyright to these editions also rewards those edi-
tors who, through diligent effort and research, have preserved the
integrity of the original.20 6 If the trivial variation test were em-
ployed, the editor's contribution would gain protection.207 But
such protection would extend only to the editor's individual ex-
pression, preventing unnecessary removal of material from the
public domain.
B. Folk Music
With respect to folk music, one commentator has urged adop-
tion of the European concept of drolt moral,208 a doctrine which
provides the author of a work with a right and remedy in addition
to copyright.2 09 This commentator has also suggested coupling
drolt moral with a criminal statute that could be used against any-
one deliberately claiming copyright of a public domain work."
performer to shift on second finger. While this shift may be lyrical and will add a subtle
nuance, it is dangerous because it may add an unattractive slide or a break in the line.
Moreover, it is inauthentic for Baroque music.
The foregoing explanation illustrates the minute considerations involved in the selec-
tion of fingering for even a short passage of music. Nor do the enumerated examples ex-
haust the possibilities for fingering this passage. The originality contributed by artistic
fingerings is certainly sufficient to meet the trivial variation test. It is also sufficient to pass
the mere mechanic test since artistic choices, by their very nature, are not merely
mechanical.
204. 1 C. FLESCH, THE ART OF VIOLIN PLAYING 148 (1924).
205. Ivan Galamian, Josef Gingold, Leonard Rose, and many other great teachers of
this century have contributed editions of public domain music.
206. Many editions, such as those by G. Henle Verlag or Weiner Urtext, provide ap-
pendices to show various interpretations of what the notes-which are questionable be-
cause of penmanship or seemingly conflicting harmonic structures--might really be.
207. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). Copy-
right protection is extended to works whose authors contribute "something more than a
'merely trivial' variation ... "' Id. at 102-03 (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp.,
150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945)). Originality in this context, according to the Catalda
court, " 'means little more than a prohibition of actual copying." 191 F.2d at 103 (quoting
Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
208. See Coon, supra note 50, at 202.
209. The doctrine of droit moral, or moral right, grants protection to a creator's artistic
reputation as distinguished from the economic interest associated with copyright. See Roe-
der, The Doctrine of Moral Right: Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53
HARv. L. Rav. 554, 578 (1940).
210. Coon, supra note 50, at 202.
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Several other ideas have been offered concerning folk music.
To eliminate any confusion regarding the extent of an arranger's
contribution, the composer might be required to submit a copy of
the original work.2 1' If a composer gains success through the use
of a public domain work, it has been suggested that an appropri-
ate portion of the royalties and other payments received from such
work be placed in a fund dedicated to promoting "understanding
and appreciation" of music.212
Another proposed alternative is giving copyright ownership of
public domain works to the government, which would entail the
use of a compulsory licensing system.213 This possibility, besides
the extra bureaucracy it would require, raises the specter of gov-
ernment censorship by copyright law.214 This censorship could
come in two forms. One would be the imposition of an aesthetic
orthodoxy to which derivative works would be compelled to con-
form. Although some feel that government control over the use of
public domain material to prevent the corruption of classic works
is desirable,215 it would probably be best to leave this to public
opinion and the passage of time. Such a laissez-faire approach is
probably the best way to ensure that government does not dis-
courage new styles and techniques.
The second form of censorship would come from the stifling of
public opinion as expressed through folk music. Folk music has
often played a vital role in the expression of political feelings, as
evidenced by the protest songs of the 1960's. The copyright law
could well be a tempting tool for quelling such expression in times
of political unrest.216
C. The Sliding Scale Approach
With regard to original works of fundamental simplicity, the
stark distinction between protection and nonprotection should be
211. Id. at 200-01. Such submission might take the form of a written manuscript or
tape recording. It is questionable, however, whether this approach would solve the
problems presented in cases like Italian Book, where a work is taken out of the public
domain.
212. See Coon, supra note 50, at 217-18. Such a redistribution of payments would
recognize, to the most practicable extent possible, the contribution of the original author or,
if anonymous, simply the origin of the work itself. Id. at 218.
213. Id at 202-03.
214. Id. at 205.
215. Id. at 202.
216. See Newcity, The Universal Copyright Convention as an Instrument of Repression"
The Soviet Experiment, 24 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1980).
[Vol. 34:104
ORIGINALITY IN A FINITE SYSTEM
abandoned in favor of a sliding scale.2 17 Courts should tailor the
scope of protection to the extent of a work's originality. The
closer a composition comes to being a straight application of mu-
sical building blocks, the less protection it should be afforded-
perhaps only a proscription against direct copying. If a work is
slightly more complicated, it should be protected from intentional
infringement, even where a direct copying has not been perpe-
trated. Finally, works of more conspicuous originality should be
granted complete copyright protection.
D. Experts and Expert Juries
The use of experts is essential to achieving an informed analy-
sis in an infringement suit-whether for derivative works or works
comprised of a simple combination of public domain building
blocks. Almost all courts rely on expert opinion for deciding the
question of similarity, but determining the substantiality of that
similarity is left to laymen. This approach ignores the fact that
expert purchasers are often intermediaries between arrangers and
the public.218 Their judgment of the substantiality of similarity
between two arrangements can have a great impact on the ulti-
mate success of a particular arrangement or edition. Thus, their
assessments of substantiality should be given more weight, espe-
cially when the work in question will be used primarily by profes-
sional musicians. At the same time, experts should not be allowed
to lead the courts, and their analyses should be confined to specific
techniques. 219 This would enable experts to provide the clearest
possible picture of the internal workings of a composition without
needlessly overextending copyright protection or confusing the
factfinder.
Among the tests for derivative works, the trivial variation text
217. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
219. A so-called Schenkerian analysis (named for the theoretician Heinrich Schenker,
who developed the technique as a means of (I) reducing any piece of music to a few basic
types of underlying fundamental structure and (2) demonstrating the relationship between
the fundamental structure and the actual composition) would be too broad and, by virtue
of its subtlety, misleading in that it would draw similarities where the relationship between
two pieces is tentative. A chord analysis, by contrast, is a more direct method of evaluating
similarity between pieces.
Compare the Schenkerian analysis with the chord structure analysis in the following
example:
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seems most consistent with the current statute 220 and best suited
for application by judges and juries. While judges and juries lack
the technical expertise to determine whether a substantial similar-
ity exists between two derivative works, they are capable of de-
tecting the sort of trivial variation for which copyright has been
granted. Because it invokes only a meager amount of musical ter-
minology, the trivial variation test can be applied with consistency
by laymen. Moreover, it extends sufficient protection to public
domain works while permitting copyright for extremely subtle
arrangements.22'
Another possibility is impaneling a special jury drawn from a
pool of "experts" (knowledgeable musicians) set up by local musi-
cians' unions or ASCAP.22 2 The concept of special juries has re-
cently been debated in the field of antitrust, where cases are so
complex it is feared the average juror cannot sufficiently under-
stand the issues and evidence to render a competent judgment.223
Jurors' previous experience has not, for the most part, prepared
them to decide a case involving such technical concepts and
K Perfect 4th- 1]F Perfect 4th 7
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L. von Beethoven, Symphony no. 3 in E-Flat Major, op. 55 ("Eroica"), meas. 93-105 (1804)
(analyses by Lawrence Hampton). The top line, the Schenkerian analysis, offers broad
outlines of the two consecutive perfect fourths. The bottom line, a chordal analysis of the
harmonic progression, gives a clearer impression of local harmonic events (the harmonies
as they are happening), and is less likely to draw tentative connections between two pieces.
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
221. Ravel's orchestration of Mussorgsky's Pictures at an Exhibition (1922) does not
change a note of Mussorgsky's original piano composition until the end of the very last
movement. Faithfulness to the original, along with the creative vitality of the orchestra-
tion, make it a work of genius.
222. For a discussion of special juries, see Luneburg and Nordenberg, Specially Quali-
fied Juries and Expert Nonfury Tribunals: Alternativesfor Coping With the Complexities of
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887 (1981).
The "experts" need not be virtuosi. All that is needed is someone who can read music
and has some rudimentary idea of harmony and composition. Juries of steadily employed
musicians need not be the standard. Anyone with the equivalent of approximately four
years of piano lessons would have the requisite insight.
223. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir.
1980). See generally A. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM
(1984) (documenting lack ofjuror comprehension and retention and suggesting devices to
improve lay jury's functioning in complex trials).
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questions.224
In recognizing the need for a special jury, one must accept the
basic proposition that "[a]ll people are not equally capable of
learning about new concepts and applying them to the solution of
difficult problems." 22 If the right to a jury trial is the right to a
competent jury,2 26 copyright is an ideal area for the adoption of
special juries. Copyright litigation often subjects juries to testi-
mony regarding musical structure which is valueless without the
technical expertise to assess the originality of those structures.22 7
Only through an "expert" musician's familiarity with musical ter-
minology and knowledge of the novelty and sophistication of vari-
ous musical techniques can well-reasoned, competent decisions be
handed down.
228
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note addresses two distinct areas of musical copyright.
One involves derivative works and editions of public domain mu-
sic.229 The other involves original works so simple that they con-
stitute little more than outgrowths of musical building blocks.230
Although these areas are distinct, the underlying goal in both is
the same: copyright must protect a composer's originality, but it
must also preserve the availability of public domain music and
ideas.
Derivative works have gradually gained more protection
under modem statutes.231 In seeking to define originality in the
context of derivative works, courts have struggled to formulate a
224. See generally A. AUSTIN, supra note 223.
225. Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 222, at 900.
226. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d at 1079.
227. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
228. The decisions discussed in this Note show that most judges are incapable of gain-
ing the requisite musical expertise to deliver well-reasoned opinions. Two of those deci-
sions, Fred Fisher, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (granting protection to do-re-mi ostinato),
and Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 876 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910) (deprecating "monotonous" rag-
time as "the lowest grade of the musical art"), were written by Judge Learned Hand, whose
opinions "for more than halfa century illuminated the law of copyright and unfair compe-
tition." B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, JR., CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
OTHER Topics BEARNG ON TiE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC
WORKS 191 (3d ed. 1978). If such a luminary can deliver two of the most untenable rulings
in musical copyright, it is certainly fair to suggest that less accomplished judges need fur-
ther guidance from experts.
229. See supra notes 10-122 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 125-74 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
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workable standard.232 Starting with the mere mechanic test,233
which focused less on originality than on technical musical skill,
courts progressed to a substantiality test,234 which awarded protec-
tion on the basis of differences between derivative and preexisting
works. While an improvement over the mere mechanic standard,
the substantiality test placed undue emphasis on melody as the
source of a work's originality.2 35 Gradually, the substantiality test
evolved into the more liberal trivial variation standard.236 This
standard has helped to disabuse courts of the linedrawing they
engaged in under the mere mechanic test. It is a desirable stan-
dard in that it gives protection to the individual expression of an
editor or arranger. Unfortunately, even the trivial variation test
has been applied without a grasp of basic musical terminology.
Protection of public domain musical building blocks has con-
sistently been mishandled and neglected by the courts. This Note
addresses melodic,2 37 harmonic, 23 and stylistic elements 239 which
are part of the public domain, but which can be combined to form
works containing a degree of originality.2 ° Rather than endors-
ing the stark distinction between protection and nonprotection for
works comprised of building blocks, this Note suggests that a slid-
ing scale be adopted.24' This approach would tailor the scope of
copyright protection to the extent of a work's originality.
Without input from expert musicians, neither the trivial varia-
tion test nor the sliding scale approach can be applied with any
coherence. Courts have consistently shown themselves incompe-
tent to deal with musical terminology.242 This Note suggests that
a jury of experts be impaneled to decide copyright cases.243 Only
with the assistance of experts familiar with compositional tech-
niques and basic musical terminology can courts begin to reach
well-reasoned opinions.
The proposals in this Note are both practical and flexible. The
trivial variation test proposed for derivative works and the sliding
232. See supra notes 27-122 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 27-57 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 58-100 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 123-74 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 34, 41 & 84 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 218-28 and accompanying text.
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scale approach for works comprised of building blocks will finally
eliminate linedrawing. Works will no longer be divided into stark
categories of copyrightable and noncopyrightable. A composer
will finally be awarded protection for his individual expression.
And expert juries will ensure that the scope of protection is deter-
mined with sensitivity and discrimination.
Soon, modem techniques such as computer music, aleotoric
music,2 " and serialism will come before the courts. Faced with
these new forms, older approaches like melodic analysis and the
mere mechanic test will prove obsolete. To be viable in the future,
copyright analysis must eschew linedrawing and a preoccupation
with melody. These are the advantages of the sliding scale and
trivial variation approaches. Moreover, use of experts will guar-
antee the flexibility to accomodate new musical forms. The sug-
gestions formulated in this Note will enable the law of musical
copyright to resolve disputes with greater sensitivity to the art
form it addresses.
RONALD P. SMITH
244. Aleotoric composition is the technique of sequencing and juxtaposing improvisa-
tions. D. GROUT, supra note 57, at 721 n. 11.
